Transsomatechnics and the Matter of ‘Genital Modifications’

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The call for papers was written by the conference organiser, Susan Stryker, whose capacity to inspire never fails to move me. 2. In her phenomenological account of the ways in which ‘bodies are shaped by histories which they perform in their comportment, their posture … their gestures’ and (dis)positions, Sarah Ahmed Ahmed, Sara. 2006. Queer phenomenology: Orientations, objects, others, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] suggests that Orientations are about the direction we take that puts some things and not others in our reach. So the object, which is apprehending only by exceeding my gaze, can be apprehended only insofar as it has come to be available to me: its reachability is not simply a matter of its place or location … but instead is shaped by the orientations I have taken that mean I face some ways more than others. (2006, 56) 3. So, for example, the paper raises the question—although never explicitly—of the anatomisation of ‘the body’, its mapping, its dissection into ‘parts’, the codification of organs, and so on, and in doing so contests the notion of a pre-discursive body (and parts thereof) overlaid with and/or modified by culture. 4. Badmington writes: ‘The “post” is always caught up with what it is “posting”’ (2003, 20). 5. In an extremely insightful account of what she identifies as the continuum and the analogue approaches to ‘cross-cultural’ accounts of body modification, Carolyn Pedwell Pedwell, Carolyn. 2007. Theorizing ‘African’ female genital cutting and ‘Western’ body modifications: A critique of the continuum and analogue approaches. Feminist Review, 86: 45–66. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] makes a similar point, suggesting that ‘the continuum and the analogue approaches … often do not represent fundamentally different theoretical frameworks’ (2007, 47), and that in fact the latter often slips into the former. At the same time, however, she demonstrates, as I hope I do, that the structural differences between the various approaches are in fact significant. 6. This is not to suggest that this is the only explanation, or that it is the entire explanation. A critical analysis of the perceived disjunctions is, for example, equally necessary. 7. I am not suggesting that we should (or even that we could) always and only consider particular practices and modes of embodiment alongside all of the others with which they may, in varying ways and to varying degrees, intersect. Clearly, mapping these (infinite) intersections would be impossible, and even were it not, such an undertaking would run the risk of arresting the necessarily transitoriness (shifting) of that which it traces. 8. I put this term in quotation marks to indicate that in my opinion it is not a neutral descriptor applied to an already-constituted empirical reality. See also Sullivan (2007 Sullivan, Nikki. 2007. The price we pay for our common good?’ Genital modification and the somatechnologies of cultural (in)difference. Social Semiotics, 17(3): 395–409. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). 9. For a particularly interesting account of the limits of human rights discourse, see Gatens (2004 Gatens, Moira. 2004. Can human rights accommodate women's rights? Toward and embodied account of social norms, social meanings and cultural change. Contemporary Political Philosophy, 3(3): 275–99. [Google Scholar]). 10. Of course, what is ‘routine’ is particular to a specific given time and place. In a different cultural context, sex assignment procedures may be perceived as bizarre, ‘unnatural’, profane, and so on. 11. Germaine Greer makes similar claims in the tellingly entitled Whole Woman (1999 Greer, Germaine. 1999. The whole woman, London: Doubleday. [Google Scholar]). 12. Interestingly Australian anti-FGM legislation states that ‘consent to FGM is not a defence to a charge under the relevant sections of the Acts’, thus clearly implying the impossibility of consenting to what in legislative terms is tantamount to mutilation. For a more detailed discussion of this point see Sullivan (2007 Sullivan, Nikki. 2007. The price we pay for our common good?’ Genital modification and the somatechnologies of cultural (in)difference. Social Semiotics, 17(3): 395–409. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). 13. The terms elective amputation or self-demand amputation are used commonly, in the particular historic-cultural context in which I work, to refer to (the desire for) the removal of a limb or limbs deemed to be healthy. Whilst I too deploy this term, I want at the same time to open it to permanent political contest: by including elective amputation (as it is commonly understood) in this paper I aim, amongst other things, to demonstrate its possible proximity to the ‘amputation’ of other healthy organs, tissue, or body parts. 14. ‘Wannabe’ is an identity term frequently used by people who desire the amputation of what would be regarded commonly as a healthy limb. 15. I do not want to suggest that ‘self-demand amputation’ is a singular unified phenomenon, nor do I want to suggest that it is the only example of BIID. See Sullivan (2005 Sullivan, Nikki. 2005. Integrity, mayhem and the question of self-demand amputation. Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 19(3): 325–33. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). 16. See, for example, Matlock (2004 Matlock, David. 2004. Sex by design, Los Angeles: Demiurgus Publications. [Google Scholar]) and Apesos et al. (2006 Apesos, J.ames, Jackson, Roy, Miklos, John and Moore, Robert. 2006. Vaginal rejuvenation: Vaginal/vulvar procedures, restored femininity, Los Angeles: LM Publishers. [Google Scholar]). 17. This includes procedures such as labial reduction, the removal of the clitoral hood, vaginal tightening, G-spot enhancement, hymen reconstruction, labial liposuction, and so on. 18. www.amptoons.com/blog/archives/2003/07/15/body-integrity-identity-disorder/ [cited 13 March 2006]. 19. MTF is a term used to refer to what is understood commonly as a male-to-female transsexual. 20. For a detailed account of habitus and its role in the formation of seemingly natural or innate (dis)positions, see Sullivan (2009 Sullivan Nikki . 2009 . The somatechnics of intersexuality . GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 15 2 : 313 – 27 .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 21. Morland (2001 Morland, Iain. 2001. Is intersexuality real?. Textual Practice, 15(3): 527–47. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) makes a similar claim in his deconstructive analysis of intersexuality.