Liberals have long been committed to two axiomatic claims about freedom: that the exercise of control within one's private space epitomizes individual liberty, and that each person must be free to define and pursue the good life for themselves. Together, these claims form a conception of freedom as autonomy (from the Greek Auto-Nomos, giving law to oneself), conceptualized as a personal space in which each can act according to one's own view of the good, free from external constraint. Liberal theories of justice have embraced such claims about autonomy, defining justice in terms that recognize sovereignty within one's personal space and protect individuality. John Rawls's primary goods,1 Ronald Dworkin's resources,2 and Amartya Sen's capabilities approach3 all focus on instrumental goods within a metric of egalitarian justice, allowing individuals full control over their personal spaces of autonomy while maintaining the bases for interpersonal comparison that distributive justice requires. This spatial conception of liberty has dominated liberal thought at least since J. S. Mill's observation that “the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to attain it.”4 Here, Mill not only defines individual liberty in terms of autonomy, but he also specifies its limits: each of us should be free to pursue our own ideas about the good within our own space, bounded only by the space of others, where our acts infringe upon their autonomy.5 If this autonomous space is to play the role that Mill and other liberals have long assumed, it must be sufficiently large to allow for a wide range of actions and choices, allowing each to express their individuality without encountering the limits that Mill mentions and the constraints on action that they entail. If almost everything that I do impedes others from pursuing the good in their way—harming them directly, limiting their opportunities, or otherwise infringing upon their space—then my personal space becomes vanishingly small, and my liberty but a trivial abstraction. This spatial conception of freedom is challenged by analyses emerging from the ecological crisis, which offer competing accounts of personal space with quite different implications for the exercise of individual autonomy.6 Given ecological limits, aggregate ecological space7 (i.e., life-supporting natural resource-based goods and services, conceived in spatial terms) is finite and threatened by current patterns of over-appropriation, yielding imperatives to fairly allocate that space among various claimants, present and future. Uninhibited autonomy, as construed above, is not sustainable, justifying significant limits on both personal space and acceptable conceptions of the good life if one person's exercise of liberty is to be prevented from diminishing another's opportunity to do the same. The personal space of autonomy has always been physical and temporal as well as conceptual in that actions undertaken within it could affect current and future others, and consideration of such effects has always set the boundaries of each person's space. Ecological limits highlight the urgency of fairly allocating personal space, bounded in this same way but increasingly scarce, and require us to resurvey its conceptual boundaries in light of its physical and temporal ones. Nearly everything we do to survive (e.g., eating, breathing), not to mention activities associated with living well, makes a de facto claim on ecological space, and under conditions of scarcity this could be construed as (following Mill) depriving others of the ecological space they need to pursue their good, thus justifying severe limits on our actions and choices. Given such limits, basic actions like breathing and eating may reside wholly within my personal space of autonomy—at least as it is construed in the strong sense, in which I am completely autonomous—since they occupy ecological space that could be claimed by others and which is subject to distributive justice. Insofar as my sphere of personal liberty is construed as the domain of what Mill terms “self-regarding conduct” and in which he argues that “the public has no right to interfere,”8 it appears that this sphere of individual autonomy becomes vanishingly small in light of analyses concerning ecological limits. If activities as basic as eating and breathing make claims on shared ecological space rather than taking place within a purely private domain, then the liberal sphere of autonomy may be restricted to exclude even rudimentary human functioning, let alone my cultivation of the sort of individuality that Mill imagined. Since nearly all of my acts and choices make claims on ecological space, justice can no longer tenably be theorized primarily in terms of goods designed to maximize or maintain personal space, but must instead begin with considerations of how much shared space any person may defensibly claim. To challenge Mill's conclusions with his own logic, ecological limits suggest that very little of our conduct is genuinely “self-regarding” in the sense that justifies our “absolute” sovereignty within the personal spaces of autonomy in which persons enjoy “the liberty of tastes and pursuits.” Rather, nearly all of our conduct and thus makes us to and the limits upon our liberty in the of Given the of liberal the of ecological limits, liberal justice must be from a set of liberty and autonomy to spatial limits on the ecological claims that persons make in their of the good life if it is to to play the role of among competing claims of individual freedom and of the bases for personal must recognize the role that conditions play in human as well as the of the activities associated with human and it must the of justice as with that of the of the that it analyses of justice and over where the of justice is to justice must be with allocating ecological space. The scarcity of ecological space need not the liberal conception of freedom as autonomy, and the of ecological space defines the sphere in which persons can make the of autonomous choices that within the constraints that it of individual to ecological space, can be no space for autonomy, for the two spaces one and the same. I can be within my own space of autonomy only so long as I do not claim of ecological space in the the of this scarcity by liberal theories of justice require of liberal that by theories of egalitarian justice, and of and of from theories in light of from this my is to how liberal egalitarian justice be by ecological limits and how it to the but to fairly allocate ecological space. 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ecological which the of for ecological at both individual and aggregate but in to focus on the spatial of ecological rather than the for it I the for ecological space among persons and to and the ecological and the of ecological space in to and while the only and the ecological for all is external affect the of such of and so but within any and in one's is a in one's individual acts and also play a significant of a in the same in the of that is to and their the that they must for or to for as well as the of their choices, and otherwise make a wide range of choices that can or their individual claims on ecological space. the of such wide interpersonal is a personal to have a strong for the of ecological space they require as of their conceptions of the good, for of and while others do individual for ecological space is and according to individual and that can or that and than about ecological space has in is not space to the current de facto claims human let alone of a or and this and 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well as the constraints that they on others their of shared This of may be by and the of for claims that one but it need is a way of that from aggregate patterns of to the individual acts and choices that aggregate even where such acts by to and that the of ecological space for of claims on ecological space claims in place a sphere of autonomy in which acts and choices that not otherwise as private and thus from or at least while associated with purely of the choices and activities that as private the of public that like that of the of one's personal choices. claims on ecological space as but as and the of ecological space makes it to choices as and subject to sovereignty such acts and choices and that defines of ecological so wholly private purely the liberal that acts in can be as or where the to any Liberal autonomy thus on a rather than ecological space is the and of the within and a of justice theories that have been in conceptions of this liberal and theories that have been upon natural or ecological space may under conditions of ecological of a set of conditions for the of from the so long as each and as for that as much as can make as good as taking at the of this is that of from the that scarcity do others and thus may require their or at least the to that to that the this in the and of his he that of in this which is to his conditions of in or ecological space, the from the by one person has no on for others to even if it scarcity at the under such conditions the has no in individual claims on by and the act of need not be as a of or justice. has and is under conditions of as others have of ecological space may other from the liberal us to on the of in light of a set of such the way that liberal autonomy is theorized with egalitarian justice justice for primary goods as the of in they can be than can natural primary but also as instrumental goods their as primary is with to various conceptions of the good persons need in to pursue their own of the good of what their individual conceptions of the good so a resource-based view of justice the liberal on autonomy of as well as within thought that to one view of the good within Dworkin's of liberal egalitarian justice makes makes it to persons for their choices, allowing for but of to any life or conception of the good that they persons in Dworkin's view autonomy and then for the choices that they make from the natural of and the effects of this conception of individual autonomy, which egalitarian justice and the that it to the liberal the focus is on allocating instrumental goods that persons may as they subject only to the constraints that they not them to others and that each for their choices in how such goods by instrumental goods the of egalitarian and how goods the of individual autonomy, egalitarian justice theories like of and the wide in claims on ecological space that from the way that their of This is in large to the way that both and on to the personal space of liberal for bases his on the of a where egalitarian is so long as no of goods to their to Dworkin's thought what of to pursue a of about the their choices on other and on the of that may fairly be by for the same the scarcity of that good its to each about the to others of to that this concerning to others the is to on the ecological space that they claim their various not on Dworkin's where such space is to be and not only do they any of about how these claims others but they have to on others claims on ecological the if each person to on of ecological space in the or from others their claims on space their personal a form of for the could Dworkin's the that it long as ecological space is not as among the goods to be subject to egalitarian Dworkin's of autonomy and Rawls's is upon the of limits on the aggregate of primary goods to be and subject to egalitarian the of the for is in and by to that of primary goods can the of the to be among all of it for such to the least or not this sort of is not be my but to the the of egalitarian justice and associated with ecological space. The finite in a way that the not to to claim of ecological space may in a of primary the if this is the least but it the of ecological space to persons and If the is to to of ecological space, it be in the same way or for the same as in justice since any in the of a finite good of that good for the least well of these view autonomy the of free persons instrumental in the of private by external where justice is primarily with the of the role of like ecological space, both and to recognize the role that ecological space in human and to a sphere of autonomy of the activities that to ecological This of ecological limits has to be within egalitarian justice like and have that claims on the natural for the of the least giving to claims of in to or the that of the in for the that from their for can be or even for with of it as a their to ecological space, instead on natural like and that can be for but the effects of and on ecological for the way that ecological limits and to human or the role that individual autonomy in choices can play in ecological a justice theories have to from the of ecological limits, but much to be and implications to be since make claims on the ecological of others by than the within their can a of ecological space that ecological as well as even for and than that have been thus and may be in that ecological goods subject to egalitarian and for and present but the for may be even with ecological at least of these and the claims with which they one to the as rather than and that justice the of a the to the that to to Since this is not within any to it be in the way that to other thought to since all and of their of it a of ecological that the to the of This finite and the of and effects claims to of space in ecological and other that the resource-based accounts that have thus dominated justice how egalitarian justice theories be on of allocating ecological space, and how about ecological space or theories of distributive the of justice in terms of allocating space and of above, ecological space is a genuinely in that it giving to over individual and of space that other and Given the of such over finite this spatial conception of ecological space by and by that the ecological a of for a in for rather than the of that be in a or to The of justice in terms of ecological space, its and and the in the of the that it The spatial conception the of of and the of or in the that ecological space or the that is the is by the persons and and is to its the of not to its or The is so the of any must of this and the by to a of which the for the of ecological space by any to its and conditions for future the of egalitarian justice so be over distributive justice in terms of ecological space for analyses of the aggregate human of ecological space is to for which also require ecological space for their and the of like in distributive justice can be with of as both allocating ecological space as the of their of with goods that instrumental to human but to ecological space of that how the for justice among in with human persons and and ones. of distributive justice in terms of the of ecological space among all thus makes a view that the and of over focus on ecological space rather than like primary goods need not require the of autonomy, and space for persons to exercise control over their own personal spaces in a that is of Mill's of the as above, this sphere of liberty ecological limits so the focus on autonomy can no longer play the role in justice that it to each person's to exercise control over their personal space of autonomy is the by others in their own personal must metric of ecological goods and allocating not only what need to survive and but also what they as of that of justice that for the least as the to patterns of on a of or at least in which in for the without even in by the view of ecological limits at least in by the as a for the of the this has in the of a of which that of and in can be in the of in its has not been in egalitarian justice theories that their to have for for a and on within or even among as justice have with to of ecological limits within egalitarian justice need not the form of for the of and as in and Rather, it the form of a goods which subject to ecological limits, such as the of that and require of ecological space, and which such as and as well as the other of human may be to the of and to be to the without of the the same be of their of ecological space. The effects of the be from in by claims on ecological space, is to the of or in the the of ecological as human from the same ecological and may be allowing to with ecological or they may in allowing persons by to their without in or Insofar as these ecological can be to the they the egalitarian of the but do so without the in ecological the from a of ecological what be claim on of that space in to their of ecological limits within egalitarian justice by conceptions of the good that on acts and choices, as it it need not the that has the of justice in that for all to be as free and limits on freedom in to protect the freedom of of this act in terms of allocating ecological space how but this can
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Steve Vanderheiden (2009) studied this question.
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