Basic deviance reconsidered

Most contemporary philosophers of action agree on the following claims. Firstly, the possibility of deviant or wayward causal chains poses a serious problem for the standard causal theory of action. Secondly, we can distinguish between different kinds of deviant causal chains in the theory of action. In particular, we can distinguish between cases of basic and cases of consequential deviance. Thirdly, the problem of consequential deviance admits of a fairly straightforward solution, whereas the possibility of basic deviance constitutes a separate and difficult problem that requires its own solution. I will argue that the problem of basic deviance is no more troublesome than the problem of consequential deviance, as a solution to the former is implicit in the standard solution to the latter. The standard causal theory of action construes intentional, rational and autonomous agency in terms of event-causal processes that lead from some of the agent's mental states and events to the performance of an action.1 It assumes that actions are events, which are actions partly in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents. The right mental antecedents are some of the agent's mental states and events (such as beliefs, desires and intentions), which rationalize the performance of the action: the action appears as intelligible in the light of those mental states and events. I shall call such mental attitudes the agent's reason states.