An empirical investigation of young children’s awareness and usage of intentionality in criminal situations.

For an alleged criminal to be found guilty, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused both committed the criminal act (actus reus) and intended to commit that act (mens rea). When the evil intent is not present the law does not seek to punish the individual, at least criminally, for most crimes. The criterion of intentionality is also applied to juveniles in most criminal situations but not nearly in so consistent a fashion. For example, the historical common law rule was that there was an irrebuttable presumption that children under the age of 7 were incapable of entertaining the requisite criminal intent, that for children between the ages of 7 and 14 there was a rebuttable presumption of no intentionality, and children 14 and over were treated as adults. A review of the law in all 50 states reveals that this basic position, namely, exculpating some and increasing the prosecutor's burden of proof for others, still exists in various forms today in most jurisdictions. For example, in 42 states and the District of Columbia there is statutory or case law that speaks to this issue.' This law can be