The weakening of the protection of civil and political rights constitutes one of the essential characteristics of illiberal constitutionalism in Hungary and Poland. In this piece, I analyze whether the same applies to social rights and attempt to establish the political purpose that determined this approach. To do this, I study the social policy pursued in Hungary and Poland, as well as the changes that were made or planned to be made to the constitutional orders of Poland and Hungary concerning social rights and their consequences. I argue that the constitutional protection of social rights in Poland, despite generous social transfers instituted, has not been strengthened. In fact, the weakened independence of the Constitutional Tribunal has contributed to lowering their level of protection. Meanwhile, a deterioration can be observed in Hungary, resulting from the adoption of and subsequent amendments to the Fundamental Law, combined with the erosion of the independence of the Constitutional Court. Social policy, which has served as a tool for gaining and maintaining power in Hungary and Poland, has also driven the approach to social rights under illiberal constitutionalism in both countries.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Adam Ploszka (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: