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Abstract While numerous studies consider the roles that media consolidation, court‐packing, and economic crises have played in Hungary's democratic decline since 2010, none have considered the subnational mechanisms driving illiberalism. This study examines the types of subnational procedural tinkering that propel illiberalism by reducing local capacity for institutional resilience. Specifically, we trace how the right‐wing Fidesz‐KDNP government implemented subnational constraints to prevent the reemergence of a viable political opposition by (a) limiting opportunities for political contestation and (b) reducing oversight of the governing coalition. We employ a multimethod approach, pairing systematic document analysis of city council rules and regulations in Hungary's 27 largest municipalities with 26 in‐depth elite interviews across five Hungarian regional cities with mayors, councilmembers, and local leaders of each major political party. In contrast to a large literature on subnational democratic resilience, we examine how subnational maneuvers can enable single‐party consolidation and exacerbate authoritarian tendencies in declining democracies.
Jakli et al. (Sun,) studied this question.