The Relationship of Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces

Five aspects of the relationship of strategic and theater nuclear forces are addressed in this essay, as well as some of the early policy discussions that surrounded the development of these forces. The first aspect concerns the notion that, in this relationship, the balance at each significant level of potential violence-or of deterrence-affects and is affected by the balance at higher and lower levels. Implicit in that notion is the idea of a hierarchy of potential levels of violence. I suggest that at least ten and perhaps eleven levels can usefully be distinguished and that the relationship between strategic and theater nuclear capabilities involves the interaction among at least five of these levels. Second, at each interface between levels, at least four questions arise: 1) What would be the probable military outcome of combat at that level? 2) What would be the degree of collateral destruction implicit in combat at that level, including the social and political destruction to each side? 3) What is the likelihood that either side would initiate or be deterred from initiating combat at this or higher or lower levels of combat? 4) What is the degree of clarity or ambiguity of the cut-off line between one level and the next? A third aspect of the relationship requires the recollection of some of the turning points in American thought about the interface between strategic and theater nuclear conflict. Fourth is a discussion of strategic rivalry and the potential use of nuclear force, at the relative force levels of deterrence, as I believe the situation is likely to evolve during the next few years. Finally, there is comment on how we might approach the problem and what we should do about it.