Social Constructions, Anticipatory Feedback Strategies, and Deceptive Public Policy

Elected leaders adopt “anticipatory feedback strategies” in designing public policies that generate support and forestall opposition. This contention is at the core of a social construction theory of feedback. Officials anticipate approval when policies allocate benefits to powerful groups socially constructed as deserving and allocate costs or punishment to groups viewed as undeserving, particularly if these groups lack political power. Designs for powerful groups that are widely viewed as unworthy provide mainly benefits in ways that are hidden from the general public who would not approve. For politically weak groups regarded as deserving, legislators generally design policies that provide promises, but not much in terms of material benefits. Often, deception will be used to protect or enhance this particular allocation pattern, including the reinforcement, perpetuation, or change in the social constructions along with the stereotypes, labels, stigma, and accompanying narratives. Using data from legislation introduced by the 2016 Arizona Legislature, we find that most policy is directed toward providing benefits to positively viewed target populations, as expected by the theory, and legislators employ deceptive feedback strategies that protect themselves. Feedback from the general public, which otherwise might be expected, may be precluded by the deceptive strategies being used.