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The article addresses the conceptualisation of hard Euroscepticism, which must reflect current crises and challenges facing European integration, such as the war in Ukraine. The conceptualisation of party-based Euroscepticism remains problematic, particularly in delineating a clear boundary between hard and soft variants. Szczerbiak and Taggart’s dichotomous typology is regarded as highly useful, offering two fundamental ideal types. However, its practical application proves more complex. Since Brexit, explicit calls to leave the EU have declined, supplanted by reformist narratives that blur traditional categories. Nonetheless, many political parties maintain fundamental objections to European integration, often concealed by strategic ambiguity. This article argues for the continued – but recontextualised – use of the ideal type of hard Euroscepticism, accounting for contextual and strategic variation and focusing not on the ‘essence’ of each type, but on the trajectory individual parties take in relation to the EU. It offers a theoretical and empirical framework for analysing manifestations of hard Euroscepticism in the 2024 European Parliament elections, drawing on both case studies and broader regional trends.
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Hloušek et al. (2025) studied this question.
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