Political economy is a consistently under-researched aspect of unrecognized statehood. Countering homogenizing accounts centred on illegality, this article argues for a comparative analysis in order to arrive at a more differentiated and case-sensitive understanding of how the political economies of de facto jurisdictions in the post-Soviet space function. Drawing on theoretical insights from the literatures analysing late, peripheral and post-colonial political economies, this article argues that de facto elites in such entities strategize differently according to the resources and external relationships available to them. Three contrasting ideal-type models of resource extraction are proposed for contemporary de facto jurisdictions: subsistent, rentier and monopoly mediator. Each model has follow-on implications for the nature of political regime, pluralism and development, and examples of each model drawing on cases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are briefly surveyed.
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Laurence Broers (2015) studied this question.
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