At a meeting of the national executive committee of the Partido Acci6n Nacional (National Action Party-PAN) in May 1993, the party's president, Castillo Peraza, argued that the Mexican government's nervousness over the postponement of U.S. approval for NAFTA was really a fear of losing its grip on power, since Mexicans were already living with the consequences of the opening and globalization of their economy (see Galarza, 1993: 18). For over a decade Mexican government policy had rejected development based on import substitution in favor of export-led development, and this had facilitated foreign investment in the stock exchange, the privatization of state companies (e.g., telecommunications), and the proliferation of maquiladoras. There was an explosion in the numbers of maquiladoras throughout the eighties and a blurring of the legal distinctions between this sector of the economy and others. Forms of work organization pioneered here were extended to other sectors of the economy (e.g., automotive finished products), prompting the suggestion that the entire Mexican economy was being maquiladorized. In comparison with traditional Mexican industry, maquiladorized industry paid lower wages, was nonunion in orientation, classified most workers as unskilled, and was characterized by a high proportion of women workers (see Carrillo, 1990). On May 26, 1993, the Banco de Mexico reported that exports from maquiladora plants had for the first time surpassed the foreign sales of other Mexican manufacturers in a given quarter. It also announced that goods imported to Mexico for use in
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Kathryn Kopinak (1995) studied this question.
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