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In a recent article (Fishbein & Middlestadt, 1995) we attempted to show that much of the evidence supporting nonbelief‐based models of attitude formation and change could be viewed as methodological artifacts. Perhaps not surprisingly, the article has stimulated a number of responses. Unfortunately, many of these commentaries appear to be more a defense of a dual processing model of attitude formation and change than an attempt to address what we believe to be a fundamental methodological issue in attitude research—namely, can one demonstrate nonbelief‐based attitude formation or change without appropriately assessing the belief structure that theoretically underlies the attitude? In this article, we review the three types of evidence that were presented in support of nonbelief‐based attitude formation and change, and we conclude that there is little empirical evidence to support such a nonbelief‐based view. Other theoretical and methodological issues raised by the commentaries are also addressed.
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Fishbein et al. (1997) studied this question.
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