Failure or success? Regime fragmentation in the context of decentralization reform in Ukraine

Decentralization reforms across the world have become a key policy focus in recent decades, aimed at improving governance and fostering development. Yet the outcome varies considerably. The design, implementation, and outcomes of these reforms are critically shaped by specific political, economic, and institutional contexts. The article explores Ukraine's decentralization reform, focusing on its process, implementation, and consequence for the neo-patrimonial system of governance – characterized by informal power networks and clientelistic relationships. It shows that the impact of decentralization depends on how the formal process is implemented and how it interacts with the existing neo-patrimonial structures. Drawing on the analysis of the process, combined with data on local elections between 2010 and 2020, the article argues that the reform and its deficiencies contributed to enhancing the risk of local elite entrenchment, bolstered incumbents at the sub-national level, and spurred the proliferation of sub-national electoral vehicles in the form of regionally based clientelistic parties controlled by local authorities. These dynamics have the potential of deepening regionalization and fragmenting the neo-patrimonial system of governance. The increasing power of regional actors, however, can also mitigate the risk of authoritarianism emerging after the war.