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April 1, 2008American Economic Review

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections

Marco Battaglini Rebecca B. Morton Thomas R. Palfrey

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Abstract

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections by Marco Battaglini, Rebecca B. Morton and Thomas R. Palfrey. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 194-200 of American Economic Review, May 2008

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Battaglini et al. (2008) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a12fde15bb7edc7189e922d https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.194

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Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

1Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury TheoremOriginal Research · 1996 · 1,104 citations
2Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not VotingOriginal Research · 2004 · 440 citations
3Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private InformationOriginal Research · 1997 · 607 citations
4Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse PreferencesOriginal Research · 1999 · 271 citations
5Television and Voter Turnout*Original Research · 2006 · 830 citations

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