This paper investigates the role of Venture Capital (VC) in the likelihood of delisting via mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for European companies listed in the 2004–2014 period, till 2020. Takeovers of listed companies are generally associated with underperformance, suggesting a need for a change in corporate control. In contrast, we show that VC-backed listed companies are more likely to be acquired when they exhibit higher growth rates compared to their peers. Moreover, this effect is driven by companies backed by low-reputation VCs. These VCs are known to rush their portfolio ventures to IPO and to have a limited post-IPO involvement. These conditions, combined with strong growth, may attract acquirers who perceive a need for change in corporate control. Conversely, we find no evidence of an increased likelihood of delisting by M&A in companies backed by highly reputed VCs, which tend to remain independent.
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Anderloni et al. (2026) studied this question.
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