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When the Houthi rebels took control of Yemen's capital Sanaa in September 2014, Arab Gulf officials and Western pundits claimed that Iran was aiming to export its revolutionary ideology and establish a Shia empire throughout the Middle East. 1 They claimed that Iran was doing so by backing, perhaps even controlling, the Shia Houthis.The Houthi takeover came at a critical point for the region: Tehran was in the midst of negotiations to resolve the crisis surrounding its nuclear program.The resulting deal provided Tehran with sanctions relief and removed some of the barriers to Iran's reintegration into the international community.Some already wary Gulf Arab states viewed the success of the talks as an end to Iranian isolation, with the country fixing its broken ties to the West and reasserting itself as a top regional power.As a result, when it became clear that the Houthis had made substantial progress in Saudi Arabia's backyard-with the Yemeni government effectively out of the picture-Saudi officials were rattled.Following exaggerated reports of wholehearted Iranian backing of the Houthis, the Saudi-led coalition strikes against Yemen were portrayed as part of a proxy war between the two regional rivals, in which both had an equal involvement. 2Today, this view is prevalent among Gulf Arabs, whose fear of a resurgent Persian Empire dictates the course of events in Yemen. 3men is a primary zone of influence and a high priority for Riyadh. 4 For decades, Saudi Arabia has been involved in Yemen's affairs, influencing various communities for its own leverage.While Yemen does not have much to offer by way of resources, Saudi control over Yemen is a point of prestige and legitimacy for the house of al-Saud.Operating from a perceived position of weakness, Saudis portray Iran's role in Yemen as one of pure power play, an effort to strategically surround and pose an existential threat to the Arab Gulf state. 5But Tehran's involvement in the conflict has been more nuanced and limited.Yemen is far from a priority for Iran.Unlike Iran's strategy in Iraq and Syria, Tehran's Yemen policy is patchier and lacks an ultimate goal.Tehran provided some level of support for the Houthis, but it will not go as far as deploying its elite forces, as it did in both Iraq and Syria.In fact, even when Riyadh continued its air campaign in Yemen after it cut diplomatic ties with Tehran in early January 2016-days after the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad were sacked in reaction to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia-Iran did not react. 6is is significant because to resolve the current crises in the Middle East, Iran and Saudi Arabia need to find common ground or a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) -the range of outcomes in a negotiation that will be acceptable to both parties. 7While Iran is finally sitting at the table on Syria, discussions are still tense and the two sides are still too far apart.Iran stopped
Esfandiary et al. (Sat,) studied this question.
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