The growing emphasis on “positionality” in academic research—where authors disclose personal characteristics thought to influence their work—has sparked significant debate. In this article, we critically examine the concept of positionality, tracing its assumptions, implications, philosophical roots, and potential pitfalls, particularly in psychology. We conclude that positionality statements lack theoretical support, may reinforce biases, and risk fragmenting scientific discourse. Instead, we advocate rigorous, transparent methodologies and critical evaluation of research, independent of authors’ identities. Discussing solutions, we suggest that if positionalities are unavoidable in research, they must be considered as part of the knowledge claims, considered as auxiliary elements to be tested like other auxiliary (or measurement) hypotheses. Also, we briefly discuss anonymity or pseudonymity as alternative solutions for other sources of positionality biases. Our aim is to contribute to open and critical science and improve upholding ideals of critical science.
Helsdingen et al. (Sun,) studied this question.