Framing the present through the past: Ukrainian diaspora in France, Holodomor memory and the 2014 critical juncture

ABSTRACTThis article focuses on a rarely addressed aspect of the link between diaspora and memory construction: the use of historical analogies, i.e. the way in which the memory of a past event (the 1933 famine in Ukraine, known as the Holodomor) is used by diasporic entrepreneurs to frame current violent events (the Russian–Ukrainian conflict). Based on fieldwork conducted among the Ukrainian diaspora in France, I show that the critical juncture of 2014 was a key moment in the reinterpretation of the present through the past (and vice versa), and identify three core-framing mechanisms that construct the historical analogy: parallelism, causality and implication. This framing activity contributed to the reconstruction of the imagined Ukrainian community and its radical separation from the Russian one. More generally, the article highlights the need to understand memory and nation-building as transnational processes that are not necessarily tied to the personal histories of diasporic entrepreneurs.KEYWORDS: DiasporatransnationalismmemoryUkraineUkrainian warcritical juncture Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Most commonly accepted figure by scholars (Werth Citation2014). For a detailed description of the mechanisms that led to the famine, its death toll, the debates surrounding its qualification as genocide, and a general overview of other famines in the Soviet Union, see Davies and Wheatcroft (Citation2004), Graziosi (Citation2004), Werth (Citation2010).2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, International Migrant Stock 2019. This database compiles national censuses.3 The French census does not measure ethnic origin, nor the country of origin of the parents. The Federation of Ukrainian Associations in France, one of the main diaspora organizations, claims to represent 150,000 French people of Ukrainian origin.4 I use the term to encompass 1) the annexation and dispute over Crimea, 2) the Donbas war, 3) the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Russia after 2014.5 This research is part of my PhD thesis, Long-distance mobilization: Ukrainians in France and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2013-2021), to be defended.6 The names of interviewees and associations have been anonymized.7 Archives of speeches on the Presidential Administration website.8 The so-called first wave (1880-1914) consisted of peasants from Austro-Hungarian Galicia who left for the New World; the second wave (1920-1939) consisted of civil war exiles from the Russian Empire and economic migrants from Polish Galicia (Satzewich Citation2002).9 Some Ukrainian leaders abroad, especially in Poland, were aware of the famine and tried to raise awareness among policymakers (Shkandrij Citation2012). However, I did not find any evidence of such mobilization in France.10 E.g., only fifty survivors were identified in the large Ukrainian diaspora in Canada (Nikolko Citation2017).11 Philippe Naumiak, French-Ukrainian whose fathers' family was victim of the famine explains that his grandmother – with whom he met during the perestroika – "never spoke about the 1933 events" (Naumiak and Naumiak Citation2017, 18).12 The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought against the Soviets and for a time collaborated with the Germans to gain independence.13 On the commemoration of June 4, 1983, see: Échanges, revue franco-ukrainienne, n°53, juillet 1983, pp. 7-10.14 Interviews with Maria, 03.24.2018 and 11.06.2018, Lyon.15 President Lenonid Kravchuk involved representatives of the diaspora in the first national commemorations in 199316 Ukrainians who left Ukraine after independence, mainly for economic reasons, are referred to as the "fourth wave" (Satzewich Citation2002).17 Petro Poroshenko, November 28th, 2015 speech (personal translation from Ukrainian).18 Interview with Petro, 04.10.2019, Lyon.19 Interview with Serhiy, 04.04.2019, Lyon.20 Interview with André, 04.30.2018, Paris.21 Interview with Ludmila, 11.25.2017, Paris.22 Former French Prime Minister, deputy and mayor of Lyon. During his trip to the Soviet Union in 1933, he did not see the famine and did not speak about it upon his return.23 Walter Duranty, Moscow correspondent for The New York Times in the 1930s. He deliberately minimized the extent of the famine in his articles.24 In France, 8 000 persons were born in Ukraine in 2019, compared to 250 000 in Italy, 240 000 in Germany, 110 000 in Czech Republic (UN, Department of Social and Economic Affairs Citation2019), and almost 1 million in Poland.25 Between 30 and 40 000 French-Ukrainians live in France, compared to 1 million American-Ukrainians and Canadian-Ukrainians in the USA and Canada (Pawliczko Citation1994).26 Ukrainians are the 57th immigrant group (by country of birth) in France in 2019 (UN, op. cit.)27 Interview with Olga, 03.15.2018, Lille.28 In his Holodomor commemoration speech of November 25, 2017, a year before the presidential election campaign, Petro Poroshenko declared that "in the course of history, the Empire [nb: Russia] defeated Ukrainians when they were divided". He then called on Ukrainians to unite behind him "for the sake of Ukraine.".29 Maria, the founder of Ukraine mémoire, constantly reminds me that her activism is much stronger and older than that of the fourth-wave Ukrainians. She also showed me several medals she received from Ukrainian governmental and non-governmental organizations for her work on the Holodomor.