The 2015 Paris Climate Conference elicited largely independent and individual commitments from the participating countries (so-called intended nationally determined contributions) in an effort to counter climate change and achieve the collective climate goals. We argue that the Paris approach, based on individual commitments, promotes narrowly self-interested contributions. Narrow self-interest, however, will not be enough to reach the climate goals. To promote international cooperation and to discourage free riding, the collective climate goals must be translated into a reciprocal, common commitment. A reciprocal, common commitment is an agreement to abide by rules that specify cooperation efforts, provided others abide by the same rules. We argue that the best candidate for a common commitment, one that facilitates international negotiations and cooperation, is a global carbon price.
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Cramton et al. (2016) studied this question.
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