This paper considers the basic requirements for retaining the concept of as a useful theoretical category. First we examine two main pitfalls often found in current usages: reductionism and normative bias. Then we respecify the concept in terms of (1) the activities focused on, and (2) the significance of the symbols, either institutional or legitimational. Next we offer some generalizations about the internal dynamics of culture. Finally, we suggest that be treated as a specifying variable in the explanation of behavior. The concept of political culture has been extensively used for over a decade as a tool in cross-national comparisons. The prime movers in this area have been Gabriel Almond and his colleagues who have applied categories from Parsonian structural-functional theory to the concerns of science.1 Unhappily, the term has come to be employed so imprecisely that today its denotations and connotations point to differing referents and raise theoretical and methodological issues which have not been systematically explored. The general purpose of this paper is to examine the utility of the concept of culture. Specifically we consider: the major pitfalls implicit in current usages of the term; several theoretical dimensions directly or indirectly implied in these usages and in related categories; some generalizations about links among these dimensions; and the causal status of variables in accounting for variations in behaviors. Our treatment centers on theoretical issues, and hence we eschew systematic consideration of how one best measures culture. Needless to say, we do not disparage such an undertaking, but it seems practical first to focus on the theoretical standing of what will be
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Edward W. Lehman (1972) studied this question.
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