Audit quality attributes of European Union supreme audit institutions

Purpose To examine the enabling legislation of European Union (EU) member country supreme audit institutions (SAIs) for their accountability to parliament and independence from the executive arm of government. Design/methodology/approach The sample comprises the SAIs of the 25 EU member countries and the European Court of Auditors. Data were collected on 30 accountability and independence issues directly from the enabling legislation of these SAIs. Findings Results indicate that apart from a number of instances where the enabling legislation is silent, provisions generally provide for adequate independence of the SAIs from the executive arm of government. On the other hand, the provisions for the accountability of the SAIs to parliament are somewhat weaker. Research limitations/implications If actual practice or convention does not reflect the literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation, then SAIs may have more or less independence and/or accountability than suggested by the analysis of the legislation alone. Practical implications Results of this study highlight where current provisions could be further strengthened through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation. Originality/value Such findings may be useful to policy makers and legislators.