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Theoretical analysis uncovers conceptual limits in game-theoretic models of state cooperation, highlighting the overlooked influence of norms, beliefs, and preference formation.
Recent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses—e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power—are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.
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Robert Jervis (1988) studied this question.
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