Democratic Prospects in Central Asia

paradoxically often has strengthened authori tarian rule, not liberalism or democracy.1 Fur thermore, if we are honest with ourselves, we must realize that the demand to democratize the former Soviet Union as a whole, and Central Asia in particular, amounts to a call for a revo lutionary transformation of those areas, espe cially when perceived from local capitals. That transformation will probably not be a quick nonviolent one unless its advocates and leaders take special care. These bleak conclusions apply equally to issues of either economic or political democra cy. Arguably, one also plausibly could contend that whatever impetus for democratization, or at least for liberalization that ultimately concludes with some recognizable form of democratiza tion, must inevitably come from outside the region, as internal forces are too weak to make the necessary transition without foreign assis tance. But whatever external impetus might develop, it cannot offer genuine democracy on its own. It only can stimulate, support, or at best galvanize existing, even latent, domestic impulses for reform in politics and economics. Neither is this assessment confined to Cen tral Asia, for nowhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia, do we see genuine democracy or its imminent advent upon the scene.2 Moreover, Russia's democratic deficits in Russia relate strongly to Central Asia. They impel Russia's elites to sup port Central Asian dictators for classic reasons of state, not least the idea that this will some