(Mis)aligning politicians and admirals: The problems of long‐term procurement in the Canadian Surface Combatant project 1994‐2021

Popular depictions of the largest single procurement project in Canadian history—the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project—characterize it as a bureaucratic failure. What began in 2008 as a $26.2B project has expanded to at least $77.3B, and $2B has already been spent without having produced a single vessel. Unlike other major Canadian aircraft, helicopter, and submarine contracts over the past four decades, however, participants in the CSC have lauded the technical merits of the procurement process. This article argues that successful procurement in this area requires: (a) clear (naval) doctrine supporting why a specific (weapons) platform or system is needed; and (b) government acceptance of that doctrine. When these two imperatives are aligned, procurement should proceed relatively smoothly. However, such smooth procurement is highly unlikely when major systems purchases involve long time periods and shifts in elected governments, policy goals, or (naval) doctrine undermine previous understandings and agreements.