Open‐Mindedness: An Intellectual Virtue in the Pursuit of Knowledge and Understanding

Abstract Open‐mindedness is widely valued as an important intellectual virtue. Definitional debates about open‐mindedness have focused on whether open‐minded believers must possess a particular first‐order attitude toward their beliefs or a second‐order attitude toward themselves as believers, taking it for granted that open‐mindedness is motivated by the pursuit of propositional knowledge. In this article, Rebecca Taylor develops an alternative to knowledge‐centered accounts of open‐mindedness. Drawing on recent work in epistemology that reclaims understanding as a primary epistemic good, Taylor argues for an expanded account of open‐mindedness as an intellectual virtue motivated by the pursuit of both knowledge and understanding. Incorporating understanding allows for a more robust account of open‐mindedness that better accommodates common usage, avoids common criticisms, and better explains the widespread acceptance of open‐mindedness as an important intellectual virtue. Taylor also identifies the connections between open‐mindedness and several other intellectual virtues, including intellectual humility, intellectual courage, and intellectual diligence.