When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and gatekeeper elites

This article engages in the flourishing debate on the external dimension of democratization by proposing a theoretical model of when external actors can influence democratization. The argument takes its departure in a critical assessment of existing structural contributions. It is argued that structural approaches are useful in explaining interregional differences in external influence, but have difficulties coping with cases that do not adhere to the overall structural pattern – that is, with intraregional differences. To deal with these problems, I turn to Levitsky and Way's renowned framework of leverage and linkage, and argue that their theory, giving primacy to structures, is not entirely valid. The structural determinants (linkages) that constitute the basis of their explanation are not non-amenable as they claim, but can be influenced to a great extent by what I term the gatekeeper elites of the target country. That is, I claim that domestic elites should not only be perceived as mere objects of external influence, as they are in the structural accounts, but rather as gatekeepers that actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors. Hence, to fully understand when external actors can influence democratization, we need to breathe dynamism into the structural accounts by carefully evaluating, not just leverage and linkages, but also elite agency. Keywords: democratizationexternal actorselitesleveragelinkage Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Jørgen Møller and Svend Erik Skaaning for insightful comments and valuable advice. Furthermore, the author would like to extend particular thanks to the two anonymous reviewers who helped significantly improve the argument of this article. Notes The terms positive and negative should in this context not be ascribed any normative connotation; they only refer to whether the actor strengthens or weakens the democratic perspectives of other countries. Pridham, 'The European Union's Democratic Conditionality'; Vachudová, Europe Undivided. Adesnik and McFaul, 'Engaging Autocratic Allies'. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash; Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative'. Tsygankov, 'Defining State Interests'; Jubulis, 'The External Dimension'. For example, Muller, 'Dependent Economic Development'; Whitehead, 'Geography'; Kopstein and Reilly, 'Geographic Diffusion'; Levitsky and Way, 'International Linkage'; Levitsky and Way, 'Linkage Versus Leverage'; Levitsky and Way, 'Linkage, Leverage'; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. For example, Putnam, ' Diplomacy and Domestic Politics'; Milner, Interests, Institutions; Risse and Sikkink, 'The Socialization'; Yilmaz, 'External-Internal'; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization. See, for example, Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative'. First presented in Levitsky and Way, 'International Linkage', and later substantially developed in Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 44. Note, however, the main aim of this article is merely to investigate the relationship between gatekeeper elites and linkages, not to thoroughly explore its scope conditions. Such as Lowenthal, Exporting Democracy; Smith, America's Mission; Whitehead, The International Dimensions; Carothers, Aiding Democracy; Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance'; Hook, 'Inconsistent US Efforts'; Adesnik and McFaul, 'Engaging Autocratic Allies'; Magen, Risse, and McFaul, Promoting Democracy; McFaul, Advancing Democracy. For instance, Pridham, Encouraging Democracy; Pridham, 'The European Union's Democratic Conditionality'; Pridham, Designing Democracy; Youngs, 'European Union'; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, 'Costs, Commitment'; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization; Emerson, Democratization in the European Neighborhood; Vachudová, Europe Undivided; Schimmelfennig, 'Europeanization beyond Europe'. Such as Huntington, The Third Wave; Brinks and Coppedge, 'Diffusion is No Illusion'; Bunce and Wolchik, 'Favourable Conditions'; Beissinger, 'Structure and Example'; Berg-Schlosser, '"Neighbourhood Effects"'. Whitehead, The International Dimensions, 6. Kopstein and Reilly, 'Geographic Diffusion', 12. Ibid., 14. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. See Table 1 later in this article for the exact specification of the elements of the two variables. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 40–2. Ibid., 45–50. Ibid., 44, 72–3; Levitsky and Way, 'International Linkage', 33. The term gatekeeper elites is, of course, inspired by David Easton's seminal A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965). Here, the notion of gatekeepers is used to describe the actors controlling which demands from the environment pass the threshold and enter the political system. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 66. Though they use the term state elites. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. See, for example, Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative'. Vachudová, Europe Undivided. Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation'. Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash, 45–69. For instance, Bunce and Wolchik, 'Favourable Conditions'. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy'; Dahl, Polyarchy; Linz, Crisis, Breakdown; O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Such as, Higley and Burton, 'The Elite Variable', Higley and Burton, Elite Foundations; Huntington, The Third Wave; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition; Easter, 'Preference for Presidentialism'; Higley, Pakulski, and Wesołowski, Postcommunist Elites; Diamond, Developing Democracy; Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy; McFaul, 'The Fourth Wave'; Boix, 'The Roots of Democracy'; Gandi and Przeworski, 'Cooperation, Cooptation'; North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy', 344. Ibid., 356. Dahl, Polyarchy, 15–16. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 15–17. Yilmaz, 'External-Internal'. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Introduction', 16–17. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics'. Milner, Interests, Institutions, 16. McFaul, 'The Fourth Wave'. Downs, An Economic Theory. Easter, 'Preference for Presidentialism'. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Yilmaz, 'External-Internal', 82. Bermeo, 'Myths of Moderation', 315. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Introduction', 18–20. Inspired, of course, by the seminal work of March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. In-depth interviews, though, can sometimes help us untangle the reasoning behind elite actions. Wintrobe, 'The Tinpot', 851; Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 7–8, 10; Magaloni, 'Credible Power-Sharing', 715–16; Way, 'Resistance to Contagion', 230. Geddes, 'What Do We Know', 138; Vachudová, Europe Undivided, 64; Gandi and Przeworski, 'Cooperation, Cooptation'; North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, 30. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 21; Tullock, Autocracy, 10; Wintrobe, 'The Tinpot', 851; Geddes, 'What Do We Know', 138; Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, 89; Way, 'Resistance to Contagion', 230. Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation', 43–4; Way, 'Authoritarian State', 234. Löwenhardt, Hill, and Light, 'Wider Europe', 607; Way, 'Authoritarian State', 241. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 379. Tsygankov, 'Defining State Interests'. Kopstein and Reilly, 'Geographic Diffusion'; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 375. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 340–2. Sanford, 'Belarus on the Road', 139–40; Korosteleva and Lawson, 'The Belarusian Case', 35. Beichelt, 'Autocracy', 119; Eke and Kuzio, 'Sultanism', 526. Tsygankov, 'Defining State Interests', 121. Danilovich, Russian-Belarusian, 34; Deyermond, 'The State of the Union', 1193. Sanford, 'Belarus on the Road'. Burant, 'Foreign Policy', 1133. Danilovich, Russian-Belarusian. Ibid. Bugajski, 'Cold Peace', 66. Matsuzato, 'A Populist Island'. Silitski, 'Preempting Democracy'. Gnedina, 'Success and Failure', 25. Wilson, Ukraine's Orange, 37. Åslund, Ukraine, 23. Krasnov and Brada, 'Implicit Subsidies'. Kuzio, Ukraine – Crimea – Russia. Åslund, Ukraine, 88–90, http://www2.imfstatistics.org. Ibid. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 5. Przeworski, 'Some Problems'.] See Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism', for an overview.