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This work introduces the CHEx86 processor architecture for securing applications, including legacy binaries, against a wide array of security exploits that target temporal and spatial memory safety vulnerabilities such as out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double-free, and uninitialized reads, by instrumenting the code at the microcode-level, completely under-the-hood, with only limited access to source-level symbol information. In addition, this work presents a novel scheme for speculatively tracking pointer arithmetic and pointer movement, including the detection of pointer aliases in memory, at the machine code-level using a configurable set of automatically constructed rules. This architecture outperforms the address sanitizer, a state-of-the-art software-based mitigation by 59%, while eliminating porting, deployment, and verification costs that are invariably associated with recompilation.
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Sharifi et al. (2020) studied this question.
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