Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
There is a vibrant literature on civil war onset and endurance. Previous research has demonstrated that weak states are unlikely to use diversionary measures given the greater likelihood of their defeat. I offer a theoretical contribution to the literature by disentangling why this is particularly the case. Using insights from the Houthi conflict in Yemen between 2004 and 2010, the article shows how the conflict, first initiated as a diversionary operation, increased the Houthi movement's grievances and galvanised an intra-regime power struggle leading to conflict endurance. The article, thus, offers one of the few exploratory applications of the domestic diversionary war theory in weak states.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Mahmoud Farag (2024) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: