Beyond logic and argument analysis: Critical thinking, everyday problems and democratic deliberation in Cambridge International Examinations’ Thinking Skills curriculum

It is widely held that, by teaching individuals how to reason through and analyse everyday problems, the teaching of critical thinking develops the deliberative capacities essential to the healthy functioning of democracy. Implicit in this view is the assumption that a certain commensurability exists between the problems presented in such curricula and those that occupy democratic deliberation. In examining one influential critical thinking curriculum, University of Cambridge International Examination's Thinking Skills, however, this article reveals the contingency of the assumption. With its presentation of problems steeped in discourses of logic and argument analysis, and with little consideration of notions of rightness/wrongness, such a curriculum can only tend towards the development of an instrumental form of rationality that, being morally indifferent and emotionally apathetic, contributes instead to the depoliticization of democracy. Given that the nature of democratic deliberation does not only focus on what is correct, but, more crucially, on what is right, it is argued that the problems on critical thinking curricula need to both engage individuals in deliberations over issues of social good, and allow them to think of themselves in ways that fundamentally tie them to other members of society. Keywords: critical thinkingdemocratic deliberationdemocratic educationthinking skillsinstrumental rationalitycritical theory Acknowledgements I thank Michael Apple for the conversations that have contributed immensely to my thoughts on this subject, and Harry Brighouse for his valuable comments on an earlier draft. The insights rendered by Referee 1 have also been tremendously beneficial. Notes 1. These pedagogical differences reflect more fundamental debates over the nature of critical thinking. At heart the disagreement lies in whether the standards of critical thinking are uniform across a broad range of contexts and circumstances, or are sui generis to particular disciplines. For a comprehensive review of this debate, see Bailin and Siegel (2002 Bailin, S. and Siegel, H. 2002. "Critical thinking". In The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, Edited by: Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R. and Standish, P. 181–193. London: Blackwell. [Google Scholar]), Ennis (1989 Ennis, R.H. 1989. Critical thinking and subject specificity: Clarification and needed research. Educational Researcher, 18(3): 4–10. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), McPeck (1990 McPeck, J.E. 1990. Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic, New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]), and Moore (2004 Moore, T. 2004. The critical thinking debate: How general are general thinking skills?. Higher Education Research and Development, 23(1): 3–18. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). 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While this view correctly recognizes the danger of cultural bias when we try to contextualize knowledge, the binary it suggests between decontextualized problems on the one hand, and culturally specific problems on the other is, I submit, an untenable one. To be sure, the following problems—Samples 3 and 4—being socially situated, are sufficiently contextualized, yet it does not seem that any culturally specific knowledge is required in reasoning through them. 9. Recognizing the need to educate the deliberative capacities of the public sphere, Lipman and others have developed Philosophy for Children (P4C), a curriculum that through its unique 'communities of inquiry' approach seeks to not only teach critical thinking but also creative, caring, and collaborative thinking, all with an eye to the social and moral development of the child. Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (Lim 2009 Lim, L. 2009. 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