How should Japan's foreign policy or role in the world be characterized? This question has been under discussion for some four decades, and answers have often been put in terms of 'power'. By using a new framework for analyzing foreign policy – what is called 'relational power analysis' – this article aims to offer a conceptually more coherent picture of Japan's foreign policy or role in the world in terms of power. It does so by assessing a 'litmus test' for Japan's foreign policy, namely the dispute with China over the Pinnacle (Diaoyu/Senkaku) Islands. In particular, the article analyses new materials on Japan's response to the Territorial Waters Law passed by China in 1992, which strongly reasserted China's claim to the islands. It concludes that Japan exerted power over China in regard to the issue and suggests that it did so using mostly civilian instruments along non-traditional dimensions, for example, positively and defensively. What is called 'ideational statecraft' – or attempts to exert influence relying primarily on the transmission of ideas, norms and symbols – is a part of the relational power framework, and it proves appropriate to the present analysis. Japan's ability to affect the PRC with such instruments, however, is helped by the fact that leading Chinese policy-makers prioritized economic development and modernization over sovereignty. The wider implication of such conclusions is the idea that Japan is a quiet but not silent power in world affairs. Keywords: Japan's foreign policySino-Japanese relationsPinnacle IslandsSenkaku IslandsDiaoyu IslandsJapan's quiet powerrelational power analysis Acknowledgements This article is developed from my 2003 PhD thesis in Political Science at Stockholm University, and a very early version of it appeared in the European Institute of Japanese Studies Working Paper Series (no. 155). In particular I thank Jan Hallenberg and Marie Söderberg for their long-lasting support. I also thank Chris Hughes, Olav F. Knudsen, Jonas Tallberg, and anonymous referees of The Pacific Review for their valuable comments, and the participants at Section 24, panel 4, at the Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference in The Hague (September 2004) for their keen attention. I finally acknowledge the funding of the special foreign and security policy programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, under the auspices of which this article was written. Notes 1 Of course, the Pinnacle Islands dispute has been examined directly and from a wide variety of perspectives (e.g. CitationCheng 1974; CitationChiu 1996/97; CitationMatsui 1997; CitationAustin 1998; CitationChung 1998; CitationDowns and Saunders 1998/99; CitationShaw 1999; CitationBlanchard 2000; CitationSuganuma 2000; CitationValencia 2000). 2 Apart from 'discovery-occupation' (or 'prior occupation'), international law generally accounts for the following modes of territorial acquisition: 'cession', 'accretion', 'subjugation' and 'prescription'. For details, see Austin (1998: 339–50). 3 'Diet-HR' stands for 'Diet protocol from the House of Representatives,' and Gaimu for Foreign Affairs Committee, Yosan for Budget Committee, and Okinawa-Hoppō for Okinawa and Northern Territories Committee. 4 Interview with a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) official central to the PRC's Japan policy, 19 March 2001, Beijing. 5 'SWB FE' stands for BBC Summary of World Broadcasts – Far East. 6 'FBIS-CHI' stands for Foreign Broadcast Information Service – China. 7 Interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo; cf. interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000, Tokyo. Japan's anxiety over the law may have been reinforced by China's recent history of forceful advances into the likewise contested Paracel (in 1974) and Spratly (in 1988 and later in 1995) Islands while continuing to pay 'lip service to the idea of joint cooperation' (CitationHyer 1995: 42). 8 'AS-E' stands for Asahi Shimbun, evening edition. 9 'FBIS-EAS' stands for Foreign Broadcast Information Service – East Asia. 10 'AS-M' stands for Asahi Shimbun, morning edition. 11 Interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo. 12 Interview with an official at the China Section, MOFA, 22 November 2000, Tokyo; cf. interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000, Tokyo. 13 E.g. in an interview with Professor Hiramatsu Shigeo, 4 December 2000, Tokyo. 14 Interview with Professor Hiramatsu Shigeo, 4 December 2000, Tokyo; cf. interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000, Tokyo. 15 'Diet-HC' stands for 'Diet protocol from the House of Councillors'. For other details, see note 3. 16 Interview with an official at the China Section, MOFA, 30 October 2000 and 22 November 2000, Tokyo; interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000 and 22 May 2002, Tokyo; interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo; interview with a former MFA official and senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Relations, 16 March 2001, Beijing. 17 According to Cheng, critical date is the date 'after which any actions of the parties can no longer affect the issue' (CitationCheng 1974: 229). 18 Cf. interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo. 19 Interview with a member of the House of Representatives and former Director General of the Japanese Defence Agency, Nukaga Fukushirō, 13 October 2000, Tokyo. 20 Cf. interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo; interview with an official at the China Section, MOFA, 30 October 2000, Tokyo; and interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000, Tokyo. 21 Interview with a former ambassador central to Japan's China policy, 4 June 2002, Tokyo; cf. interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo; e.g. also interview with Professor Hiramatsu Shigeo, 4 December 2000, Tokyo. 22 Interview with two officials at the Bureau of Defence Policy, Japanese Defence Agency, 26 October 2000, Tokyo. 23 Interview with an official at the MSA, 27 November 2000, Tokyo. For example, two applications (in 1989 and 1996) from individual fishermen for permission to repair beacons on the islands were rejected because 'if permission had been given, it was expected that it could have exerted serious influence on international relations, and done harm to Japanese people [abroad]' (Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, 30 November 2000). Likewise, in the wake of the TWL, a politician from Okinawa took the opportunity to promote a port of refuge on the Pinnacle Islands, but officials did their best to avoid the issue (e.g. Diet-HR 123, Okinawa-Hoppō 4, 10 March 1992: 28; Diet-HR 123, Yosan, 2 Bunkakai 2, 12 March 1992: 34; Diet-HR 123, Okinawa-Hoppō 5, 12 March 1992: 14). 24 Interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 22 May 2002, Tokyo; cf. Diet-HC 123, Yosan 2, 16 March 1992: 23. 25 Cf. interview with a former MOFA official with long experience from China and Taiwan, 7 November 2000, Tokyo; interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo. 26 Interview with an MFA official central to the PRC's Japan policy, 19 March 2001, Beijing; cf. interview with a former MFA official and senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Relations, 16 March 2001, Beijing. 27 Interview with Professor Yan Xuetong, 4 April 2001, Beijing. 28 Interview with an MFA official, 15 March 2001, Beijing. 29 Interview with an MFA official central to the PRC's Japan policy, 19 March 2001, Beijing; interviews with Professor Zhang Yunling, 2 April 2001, Beijing; Professor Li Guojiang, 3 April 2001, Beijing; and Professor Yang Bojiang, 9 April 2001, Beijing; cf. interview with a former MFA official and senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Relations, 16 March 2001, Beijing. 30 Interview with an MFA official central to the PRC's Japan policy, 19 March 2001, Beijing, emphasis added. 31 Interview with Professor Lu Zhongwei, 9 April 2001, Beijing. 32 Interview with Professor Pan Wei, 14 March 2001, Beijing. 33 Interview with a PLA colonel and associate professor at the National Defence University, 19 March 2001, Beijing; cf. interview with an MFA official central to the PRC's Japan policy, 19 March 2001, Beijing. 34 Interview with a former MFA official and senior research fellow at the China Institute of International Relations, 16 March 2001, Beijing. 35 Interview with Professor Zhang Yunling, 2 April 2001, Beijing; cf. interview with an MFA official, 15 March 2001, Beijing; interview with an MFA official central to the PRC's Japan policy, 19 March 2001, Beijing; and interview with Professor Yang Bojiang, 9 April 2001, Beijing. 36 Interview with a former MOFA official with long experience from China and Taiwan, 7 November 2000, Tokyo; interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000, Tokyo; and interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo. 37 Interview with a former ambassador central to Japan's China policy, 4 June 2002, Tokyo. 38 Interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo; cf. interview with a former MOFA official with long experience from China and Taiwan, 7 November 2000, Tokyo; interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 10 November 2000, Tokyo; interview with a former ambassador central to Japan's China policy, 4 June 2002, Tokyo. 39 Interview with a former MOFA official with long experience from China and Taiwan, 7 November 2000, Tokyo. 40 The Century of Shame is the period from the first Opium War of 1839–42 until the CCP victory over the Kuomintang (KMT) in the civil war of 1946–49, when China lost large parts of its territory to Western and Japanese imperialists. The most humiliating experience of all was arguably the doctrine of extraterritoriality, 'under which foreigners in China did very much as they pleased' (CitationWang 2002: 41). 41 According to Roy (1998: 75), this kind of infighting between the PLA and the MFA in particular, where the latter generally favours a more conciliatory position, has been quite common in the PRC's foreign policy-making. 42 Interview with a MOFA top official central to Japan's China policy in 1992, 1 December 2000, Tokyo. 43 Interview with Professor Wang Jisi, 4 April 2001, Beijing; cf. Xinhua telegrams published in Chūgoku Geppō throughout the period. 44 Cf. interviews with Senior Research Fellow Abe Junichi, 13 November 2000, Tokyo; and Professor Wang Jisi, 5 April 2001, Beijing. 45 Interview with a former ambassador central to Japan's China policy, 4 June 2002, Tokyo. 46 Interview with a former ambassador and vice-minister of foreign affairs with long experience at MOFA's Treaties Bureau, 4 June 2002, Tokyo; cf. interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 22 May 2002, Tokyo. 47 Interview with a former ambassador and vice-minister of foreign affairs with long experience at MOFAs' Treaties Bureau, 4 June 2002, Tokyo; cf. interview with a former ambassador central to Japan's China policy, 4 June 2002, Tokyo. 48 Interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 22 May 2002, Tokyo. 49 Interview with an official at the China Section, MOFA, 22 November 2000, Tokyo. 50 Interview with a former ambassador central to Japan's China policy, 4 June 2002, Tokyo. 51 Interview with a former ambassador and vice-minister of foreign affairs with long experience at MOFA's Treaties Bureau, 4 June 2002, Tokyo. 52 Interview with a former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, 22 May 2002, Tokyo. 53 Interview with an official at the MSA, 5 December 2000, Tokyo (by telephone). Additional informationNotes on contributorsLinus Hagström Linus Hagström is currently Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. He received his doctorate from the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University in 2003, and his research interests include power analysis, foreign policy analysis, Japan's foreign and domestic policy, and international relations in Northeast Asia. Hagström is the author of Japan's China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis (London, New York: Routledge, 2005).
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