In Part II of this paper, we present formulations for three two-settlement market models: Baseline cost-minimization (Stoch-Opt); and two sequential market models in which an independent system operator (ISO) runs real-time (RT) balancing markets after making day-ahead (DA) generating unit commitment decisions based upon deterministic wind forecasts, while virtual bidders arbitrage the two markets (Seq and Seq-SS). The latter two models differ in terms of whether some slow-start generators can self-schedule in the DA market while anticipating probabilities of RT prices. Models in Seq and Seq-SS build on components of the two-settlement equilibrium model (Stoch-MP) defined in Part I of this paper [J. Kazempour and B. F. Hobbs, “Value of flexible resources, virtual bidding, and self-scheduling in two-settlement electricity markets with wind generation - Part I: Principles and competitive model,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 749-759, Jan. 2018]. We then provide numerical results for all four models. A simple single-node case illustrates the economic impacts of flexibility, virtual bidding, and self-schedules, and is followed by a larger case study based on the 24-node IEEE reliability test system. Their results confirm that flexible resources, including fast-start generators and demand response, can reduce expected costs in a sequential two-settlement market. In addition, virtual bidders can also improve the functioning of sequential markets. In some circumstances, virtual bidders (together with self-scheduling by slow-start generators) enable deterministic ISO DA markets to obtain the least (expected) cost unit commitments.
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Kazempour et al. (2017) studied this question.
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