The Influence of the Keiretsu on Japanese Corporate Disclosure

This paper represents a contribution to testing whether the extent of disclosure in Japanese corporate annual reports varies according to group structure. Consideration is given to keiretsu (group interfirm networks) classification and the mechanism for monitoring by a main bank or main company. This topic is of interest because the Japanese system of corporate governance is fundamentally different from those prevailing in Anglo‐Saxon countries and this distinction may impact on corporate disclosure policy. Attention is focused on the exclusionary theory of corporate disclosure in which information is disseminated within group members but specifically excludes others. Regression analysis is undertaken to assess the importance of group structure in explaining variability in the extent of disclosure after controlling for known factors such as size, stock market listing, industry, borrowings, and type of business. The results suggest that companies within a keiretsu with a main‐bank or main‐company monitor and which are therefore less subject to capital market discipline do not disclose less information than other companies in their annual reports. It appears that whatever type of corporate governance mechanism is adopted in Japan there exists a monitor that places approximately equal demands on information disclosure in corporate annual reports.