ABSTRACTRwanda and Uganda have had strained relations, oscillating between warm, lukewarm, hostile and outright war. Since the biggest falling out during the Second Congo War (1998–2003), both governments have variously accused each other of wrongdoing, including allegations of supporting rebel activities, covert counterintelligence operations and espionage. The most recent escalation in frosty relations saw the closure of Katuna border post. Because the respective ruling parties – the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the National Resistance Movement – at a minimum have shared ideological and historical origins, we would expect relations to be strong and constructive not hostile or tenuous. Yet, it is precisely the shared history and social ties among the politico-military and intelligence elites that shape the suspicion, mistrust and hostility that feed into official policies. This article analyses how shared ideological and historical origins, social relations and kindred ties inform individual attitudes and perceptions of key elites toward each other's government.KEYWORDS: Foreign policyKagameMuseveniNational Resistance Movement (NRM)Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) AcknowledgmentWe are deeply grateful to the immediate former editor, current editor of this journal and two anonymous reviewers for invaluable comments and criticisms in several rounds of revisions leading to publication of this article. The usual caveat that all errors and flaws are ours applies.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Various interviews in Kampala and Kigali, June-July 2018.2 We are grateful to Nelson Kasfir for underscoring this point during a virtual workshop on 21 July 2021.3 There is a huge literature on the 1994 Rwanda genocide and armed violence in Uganda. We cite here only a few works as this article is not concerned with dynamics of genocide and mass violence in both countries. On rebellion and civil wars in Uganda, see, for example, Lamwaka (Citation2016), Day (Citation2019), Pike (Citation2019), Lewis (Citation2020), and Schomerus (Citation2021).4 These experiences have been widely discussed in works like Prunier (Citation1995); Mamdani (Citation2001); Kinzer (Citation2009); and Reyntjens (Citation2013).5 Some estimates put the number at 4,000 fighters accompanied by 3,000 civilians (Pike, Citation2019, p. 202); another source, Prunier (Citation1995, p. 93) says they were 2,500 fighters out of an estimated 4,000 in the Ugandan army.6 Interview with a senior editor with the Daily Monitor newspaper, 12 June 2021, Kampala.7 Multiple anonymous interviews in Kigali, June 2018.8 Anonymous interview with a former senior Ugandan government official, 14 June 2021, Kampala.9 Multiple anonymous interviews in Kigali, June 2018.10 Interview with Andrew Mwenda, renowned journalist with very close ties to Kigali and Kampala, 12 June 2021, Kampala.11 Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Twitter, 16 January 2022. https://twitter.com/mkainerugaba/status/1482758145457930241?lang=en12 Interview with a veteran Ugandan journalist, Kampala, 13 June 2021.13 Anonymous interview with a senior Ugandan government official, 14 June 2021, Kampala.
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