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Among the most innovative – albeit least well known – features of the C onvention on I nternational T rade in E ndangered S pecies of W ild F auna and F lora ( CITES ) regime is the use of trade sanctions for noncompliance with the treaty. Though not foreseen at all in the original text of the C onvention, a unique system of ‘collective retorsion’ was gradually developed through a series of resolutions by the C onference of the P arties, by way of trade embargoes – that is, multilateral recommendations to suspend trade in CITES ‐listed specimens with the country concerned. Since 1985, this scheme – now codified in the 2007 G uidelines on C ompliance with the C onvention – has been enforced against at least 43 recalcitrant States (parties and non‐parties). This article reviews the historical evolution of the CITES sanction scheme in practice over the past three decades, and its effectiveness in achieving compliance. The legality and legitimacy of the scheme is assessed in light of the C onvention, other relevant international instruments and general rules of international law.
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Peter H. Sand (2013) studied this question.
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