‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Northern Ireland

This article exposes some of the problems of ‘classical’ British ‘hearts and minds’ counter-insurgency theory of the sixties by applying it to the Northern Ireland conflict. The four requirements of counter-insurgency theory were: demonstrating ‘political will’ to defeat the insurgents as the key to victory; the importance of ‘the battle for hearts and minds’ of the affected population; ‘police primacy’ over the army in defeating insurgents; and the importance of civil-military coordination to bring together all the elements of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Five problems are identified with ‘classical’ counter-insurgency theory. First, counter-insurgency theory emphasises the role of the government in defeating insurgency but does not draw attention to the tensions this can create between the political and military elites and the possible consequences for democracy. Second, the theory is found to be ambiguous and open to highly divergent interpretations, in particular on the use of force. Third, there is a tendency to overgeneralise from Britain's historical experience which does not do justice to the complexity of particular conflicts. Fourth, this leads to a tendency to apply ‘lessons’ which are not appropriate to the context. Finally, counter-insurgency theory has been unable to account for the relative success of the Northern Ireland peace process.