Countermeasure Against Regulation Mileage Compensation-Oriented Collusion Attacks in Frequency Control Ancillary Service Market

As a fundamental electrical cyber physical system, the frequency control ancillary service (FCAS) market collects bidding information from participants and generates the clearing results. In the regulation process, corrupted load aggregators can collude with corrupted participating units, forming a consortium and increasing the revenue through mileage payment. Hence, we consider the profit-oriented collusion attack in the regulation mileage compensation of the FCAS market and propose a countermeasure. Specifically, We investigate the profit-oriented collusion attack by considering the mileage compensation mechanism and frequency regulation process characteristics. Then, we study an optimization-based profit-oriented collusion attack strategy that can maximize the mileage compensation of the consortium. As for the countermeasure, we propose a deep fuzzy clustering-based detector, which can distinguish the consortium-induced from normal load variation-induced regulation process, thus preventing the consortium from causing economic loss to the system operator.