This paper offers a parsimonious theory of national institutional factors that promote or inhibit the formation of start-up firms in the USA and Japan. Three factors are proposed: the technical labor market, the venture capital market and the structure of buyer-supplier ties. Complementarities between these factors cause them to work as a system, while their differences elevate or reduce the level of incentive constraints and appropriability constraints acting on incumbent and start-up firms respectively. As a result, incumbents might be displaced in an industry in one country while incumbent firms in the same industry in another country might persevere, due to the presence or absence of start-up firms. This suggests that there may be no single best way to organize for innovation in different institutional settings; rather, firms must seek to exploit the virtues of their environment, even as they act to mitigate the hazards it poses.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Henry Chesbrough (1999) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: