Intersubjectivity and Emotion

A classic question in philosophy has been the concern with other minds. How-is it possible for one person to really know the mind of another? How can communication take place between individuals whose consciousnesses are separate and distinct (see Ayer, 1967)? The problem of meaning quickly confronts this issue. In what sense and in what way does an object (a word, a gesture, or an event) have the same meaning for different individuals? This question is also found, con-ceptualized differently and using different language, in disci-plines other than philosophy. For example, it is considered under the rubric of empathy and more recently of person perception in psychology, of consensus and shared awareness in sociology, and in various forms in the fine arts-e.g., as in the debate over the meaning of a poem or work of art. The most common approach to this problem is to attempt to