Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)

This article first argues that states have not balanced against US unipolar power because the potential balancers do not view the United States as a major threat, because they believe it has benign security-seeking motives, at least with regard to other major powers. This explanation runs counter to the Brooks–Wohlforth argument, which holds that states are not balancing because the magnitude of the United States’ power advantage makes balancing essentially infeasible. The second part of the paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the benefits of unipolarity, arguing that the benefits the United States derives from unipolarity are generally overrated. More specifically, US security need not be significantly reduced by growth in China's economy that supports a return to bipolarity. Notes 1 See, for example, the series of articles in the special issue (2009) of World Politics, 62:1. 2 Arguing persuasively that predictions of early decline were ill founded was Wohlforth (Citation1999). 3 For a recent statement see Joffe (Citation2009). 4 This is a standard list of components of power; see Waltz (Citation1979, 131). Although not central to points that I address in the text, I would take issue with including military forces/capabilities. A country that had the potential to build forces that were much larger than any other country's, but chose not to, would still be the unipolar power. Military forces are endogenous to structure and, therefore, should not be used to define it. 5 The title of my article may exaggerate the extent of this judgement, but I could not resist the parallel to Jervis' (Citation1979/1980) influential article on nuclear strategy. 6 On the basic logic of this argument see Walt (Citation1987). 7 For analysis of EU policy, see Posen (Citation2006). 8 On China's increased ability to undermine US capabilities for defending Taiwan, see Christensen (Citation2001). Although slow to modernize its nuclear force, China has also begun to improve its strategic nuclear forces. 9 In addition, China has exercised restraint because it has been sensitive to the importance of not appearing provocative as its power increases; see Goldstein (Citation2005). 10 See, however, Finnemore (Citation2009), who provides a constructivist analysis that emphasizes the limits the unipolar power faces. 11 There are, however, arguments that point to dangers that accompany unipolarity: see Monteiro (Citation2009), who argues that nuclear proliferation is more likely under unipolarity, which then creates incentives for preventive war. More common are arguments about unipolar overreach, which I discuss briefly in the text below. 12 On the lack of clarity in the ways the term bipolarity is used, see Wagner (Citation1993); for related confusion over how the term balance-of-power is used, see Nexon (Citation2009). 13 See for example Waltz (Citation1979, chapter 8), Deutsch and Singer (Citation1964) and John J Mearsheimer (Citation2001, chapter 9). 14 For a clear statement of these arguments see Gholz et al (Citation1977); for a comparison of the key grand strategic alternatives, see Posen and Ross (Citation1996/1997). 15 On the debate over the effectiveness of extending nuclear deterrence, see Jervis (Citation1984) and Glaser (Citation1990). 16 For a rational theory that includes this variable, as well as the material variables already discussed, see Glaser (Citation2010). 17 China's motives could change as its power matched or exceeded US power, so current evaluations of China's motives may not be a good guide to the future; this said, for useful current assessments, see Johnston (Citation2003) and Fravel (Citation2007/2008). 18 There is another possible exception that I do not have space to address in this short article—the importance of controlling the sea lanes of communication from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia, and across the Pacific. Both the United States and China have potentially vital interests in controlling them and the extent of the US ability to do this could depend on unipolarity. 19 This argument is frequently associated with realism. However, it does not match well with structural realism, which takes states' fundamental goals as exogenous and separate from the international situation states face, including their power. It can be compatible with classical/neoclassical realism, depending on how the theory's understanding of states' interests is formulated. 20 See Jervis (Citation2009) for a review of many of these arguments. 21 On the development of this focus, see Chollet and Goldgeier (Citation2008).