Navigating the twin risks in alliance dilemma: South Korea's foreign policy during US-DPRK nuclear crises

How do weaker states in an asymmetric alliance simultaneously manage the risks of entrapment and abandonment? Research on alliance management largely focuses on how stronger states manage entrapment while weaker states address abandonment. Such arguments reflect the military imbalance and the relative dependence between asymmetric allies. However, weaker allies can fear both entrapment and abandonment simultaneously when the former threatens their interests and security. To understand how they navigate the competing risks within the alliance, we argue that weaker allies would cautiously act as conflict managers by coordinating with allies while advancing peaceful alternatives, garnering support from the international community, and offering inducements to the adversary to incentivize negotiations. We demonstrate our argument by analyzing South Korea’s behaviors throughout three crises involving the US and North Korea in the post-Cold War era. We conclude with broader theoretical and policy implications.