House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy

The institutional design debate at the heart of much recent theoretical controversy in legislative scholarship revolves around two questions: what is the core problem members of the legislature are attempting to solve in their choice of institutional arrangements? what is the key institutional mechanism through which the problem is tackled? This analysis of special rules in the House aims to contribute to that debate directly and indirectly. I test the predictions that the principal theories make about rule choice and find the party model to be most successful in accounting for contemporary rule choice on major legislation. I then argue that my data and analysis suggest three desiderata for an adequate theory. First, it must incorporate party as a key mechanism, as the importance of party and party leadership in the contemporary House suggests. Second, the theory must be dynamic, as the change in the centrality of party leadership over time suggests; members' answer to the core question-if not the question itselfmay change over time. Third, the theory needs to posit multiple goals, as a detailed look at the design of some rules suggests.