The “paradox of unrealized power” arises when weaker states defeat more powerful states in military conflicts. Such conflict outcomes can be accounted for by stressing the lack of will or skill on the part of the apparently more powerful states, or by focusing on the extent to which power resources effective within some polity‐contingency frameworks are relatively useless in others. The fact that the former type of explanation can be unfalsifiable has led some analysts to prefer the latter. However, recent research has shown that such activation, or conversion process models are not necessarily invulnerable to evidence. Finally, the principle of parsimony offers useful guidelines when theoretical arguments and empirical evidence have contributed all they can to a resolution of controversies regarding the relative impact of alternative factors on paradoxical conflict outcomes. For example, that principle (and some empirical evidence) suggests that “smaller battalions” often win because they receive help in the form of intervention and aid from third parties.
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Ray et al. (1986) studied this question.
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