The Cognitive‐Developmental Approach to Morality: a Reply to Kurtines and Greif

A recent critique of Kohlberg's cognitive‐developmental approach to morality by Kurtines and Greif is examined in detail. It is found to contribute some useful indications of studies which were then needed, and many of which have been published since the critique appeared. A careful analysis of the literature on moral development, however, shows Kurtines and Greif s criticisms to be largely unfounded, and in several cases misrepresentative of research findings. As a result the empirical support for the ‘stage’ and ‘sequence’ components of Kohlberg's theory is underestimated, as is the evidence in favour of a relationship between moral judgment and moral action. The misunderstandings largely reflect a common and mistaken attempt to reduce structural development in cognition to static psychometric traits, an attempt which confuses developmental theories with measurement instruments.