The period leading up to and following the global financial crisis has been characterized by rising global financial diversity and multipolarity, a process underscored by the growth of so‐called sovereign wealth funds ( SWFs ). To date there has not been any systematic examination of the interactions between this rising global financial diversity and national economic institutional diversity. Here I apply an institutional “comparative capitalisms” perspective to the analysis of Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) SWF investment in G erman industry since the onset of the global financial crisis. The evidence demonstrates that a growing number of G erman industrial firms—particularly the major automotive firms at the heart of G erman industry—have recruited long‐term GCC SWF investment as an adaptive response to the stresses of financial restructuring, most importantly the appearance of hostile takeovers as a feature of the G erman corporate governance landscape. These patterns lend partial support to “varieties of capitalism” ( VOC ) arguments that institutional complementarity and comparative institutional advantage are likely to produce path dependent trajectories of national institutional evolution. They also lend partial support to critiques of VOC , emphasizing, on the one hand, the importance of the Polanyian “double movement” of market expansion and containment and, on the other, the transnational foundations of national institutional diversity. I conclude that to fully explain these patterns, both VOC theories of institutional complementarity and comparative advantage, and Polanyian theories of the double movement, must be grounded in a “generalized D arwinian” analysis of population‐level selection dynamics.
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Daniel Haberly (2013) studied this question.
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