The End of the Indonesian Rebellion

THE INDONESIAN REGIONALIST REBELLION ended in i96i. Over three years after it began in February i958, with the proclamation of a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of almost all of those who had fought for it voluntarily surrendered to local army posts in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes), most of them after negotiations with government army commanders. They brought in with them the leaders and followers of two earlier rebellions with which they had become allied-the Atjehnese Islamic rebellion dating back to I953 and the Kahar Muzakar rebellion of South Sulawesi, which broke out first in i950. Almost ioo ooo men left the path of rebellion, bringing about 20,000 weapons with them,' and Sumatra and Sulawesi are now virtually free from all rebel activity. This development is highly significant for the course of Indonesian politics henceforth. But it is also important for what can be gleaned from it about the dynamics of rebellion in contemporary Indonesia, and about Indonesian potentialities for national unity. This article discusses the rebellion principally from this point of view. The P.R.R.I. rebellion had its origins in the turbulent period of mid-i9g6 to mid-i958, a period of transition from an open and pluralistic political system to a far more authoritarian one. Indeed the rebellion and its rapid reduction to mere guerrilla proportions played a major part in making that difficult transition possible. Not long after the national elections of September and December i955, which had disappointed the high hopes Indonesians placed in them for political regeneration, the existing political order came under challenge. The loose post-revolutionary consensus began to break up, with nationalist, Islamic, Communist, military, Javanese, non-Javanese and other elite groups looking about for new roles to play. In the course of i956 two groups staked out claims to leadership of a new and changed regime. One was the group of regionalists-several army commanders of areas outside Java and their civilian supporters, most of whom were members of the modernist Islamic party Masjumi or the much