Cooperation Coupled with Conflicts: Korea–Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era

This article addresses a profoundly curious question of why Korea and Japan conflict with each other despite deepening ties and growing transactions. In contrast to the existing explanations, this article makes three analytical innovations. First, for inducing cooperation between Korea and Japan, what matters is convergence/divergence of external threat perception, not the magnitude of threat. Second, history is not a constant but a variable. Historical contentions can be escalated or deescalated depending on political situations. Third, the role of the US in managing Korea–Japan relations is important but not determinant. The style of US engagement in East Asia serves as an intervening variable for conflict management. This article suggests that frictions are highest when historical contentions are escalated and external threat perception diverges. On the other hand, cooperation potential is highest when historical contentions are deescalated and threat perception converges. Notes As of January 2008, 4,290 flights provided services between Korea and Japan. The number was 4,035, 4,249, 4,111, 4,311, and 4,156 in February, March, April, May and June 2008, respectively. Source: Korea Aviation Corporation and Incheon Aviation Corporation. Due to the decision, the Korea Wave, or hallyu, is so widespread that ordinary Japanese enjoy watching Korean dramas and are fascinated by Korean movie stars. A number of Korean young people are fond of Japanese culture represented by manga, animation, songs and dramas. Cha points out that the argument uses a constant (i.e. historical enmity) to explain a variable (i.e., cooperation/conflict) (Cha 1999 Cha, Victor. 1999. Alignment Despite Antagonism, Stanford: Stanford University Press. [Google Scholar]: 23). The functions of the US forces in Korea and Japan may be three-fold: defending allies from external threat; maintaining peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region; and containing remilitarization of the allied nations. Victor Cha seems to neglect the third function of the US forces stationed in Korea and Japan, preventing security dilemma between the two allies by containing independent expansion of military forces in Japan and Korea. Passing the bucks to the US had partly a positive function. As for the conception of buck passing related to Japan, see Jennifer Lind (2004) Lind, Jennifer. 2004. Pacifism or Passing the Bucks? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy. International Security, 29(1) Summer [Google Scholar]. He applied the logic of two-level game to the analysis of Korea–Japan relations. As for two-level game, see Putnam (1988) Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games. International Organization, 42(3) Summer [Google Scholar]. He defines net threat as the balance between the common threat and the resources that are mustered against it (Yoon 2006 Yoon and Tae, Ryong. 2006. Fragile Cooperation: Net Threat Theory and Japan–Korea–US Relations Ph.D. Dissertation at Columbia University [Google Scholar]). Yoon tries to bring in historical animosity in the broad parameter of the realist perspective. Hence, he insists that historical animosity is not incompatible with realist position (Yoon 2007 Yoon and Tae, Ryong. 2007. Searching for a New Paradigm for Korea–Japan Relations. Kukje Kyankye Yonku (IRI Review), 12(2) (Fall): 169–205. [Google Scholar]: 188). But, in this article, historical contention is separately posed as one variable that affects Korea–Japan relations. Yoon actually suggests a similar option when he operationalizes the concept of the conflicts of interests. He states that Korea–Japan relations would be largely determined by how skillfully the problem of historical animosity is managed by the decision makers of the two states (Yoon 2007 Yoon and Tae, Ryong. 2007. Searching for a New Paradigm for Korea–Japan Relations. Kukje Kyankye Yonku (IRI Review), 12(2) (Fall): 169–205. [Google Scholar]: 188). Yoon argues that Korea–Japan relations are represented by long-term progress in cooperation despite ups and downs in short-term relationship (Yoon 2007 Yoon and Tae, Ryong. 2007. Searching for a New Paradigm for Korea–Japan Relations. Kukje Kyankye Yonku (IRI Review), 12(2) (Fall): 169–205. [Google Scholar]: 195). He explains the upward move basically from the realist perspective. Net threat, US engagement and security cooperation gives a driving force for bilateral cooperation between the two countries. However, it is my position that upward drive for bilateral cooperation comes from the socio-economic and cultural cooperation that the institutionalist perspective focuses on. I agree with Yoon in that the US role is important but not determinant. However, unlike his analysis where the US commitment is integrated in the concept of net threat, I separated the US role as an intervening variable. Yoon suggests correctly that when the US disengages, Korea–Japan frictions are likely because of the collapse of containing mechanism against Japan and Korea's intensifying adversary security dilemma (Yoon 2007 Yoon and Tae, Ryong. 2007. Searching for a New Paradigm for Korea–Japan Relations. Kukje Kyankye Yonku (IRI Review), 12(2) (Fall): 169–205. [Google Scholar]: 192). Column by Masao Okonogi at Sekye Ilbo, October 29, 1993. Seoul Daily Newspaper, August 10, 1993. Dong A Ilbo. October 15, 1995. Dong A Ilbo, November 8, 1995. Dong A Ilbo, November 18, 1995 Dong A Ilbo, October 9, 1998. Hankook Ilbo, March 1, 2001. Dong A Ilbo, May 9, 2001. Korea Economy Daily, July 19, 2001. Hankook Ilbo, June 9, 2003. Hankook Ilbo, July 23, 2004. Hankook Ilbo, December 18, 2004. Hankook Ilbo, March 2, 2005. Dong A Ilbo, March 18, 2005. Dong A Ilbo, March 24, 2005. Dong A Ilbo, May 25, 2005 Dong A Ilbo, February 26, 2008. Lee Myung Bak administration is rarely exceptional in a sense that the relationship turned wild within six months after the start of the regime. Topics of the strategic dialogue should not be confined to nuclear issues or abductees issues, which are imminent and immediate concerns. It should be more long-term strategic vision for dealing with the North Korea question in general.