IN RECENT YEARS historians have begun to question traditional belief that colonial Latin American government was autocratic and centralized. In process of this reevaluation features such as corruption, which had previously been treated as weaknesses of political system, have come to be regarded as hidden strengths. Today theoretical articles emphasize that of administration provided local population with an opportunity for political influence. Colonial officials are presented, therefore, as having been responsive to local pressures, and having enjoyed considerable autonomy from central authorities.' Such arguments conclude that corruption was a safety valve for empires. The creole who surreptitiously wielded influence, it is argued, was not likely to demand formal control of government. These theoretical discussions have been confirmed by regional studies. The predominant tendency has been to argue that roots of corruption were to be found in an informal structure of primary interpersonal relations established between members of elite and royal officials. While formal structure of government placed Indies in a classic colonial position by forcing administrators to be loyal to outside authorities, the informal structure allowed colonial interest groups to treat magistrates as simply another source of power subject to alliance and cooptation.2
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jacques Barbier (1972) studied this question.