Since the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, nuclear arms control has undergone several distinct phases, from superpower détente and deep bilateral reductions to contemporary uncertainties marked by treaty erosion and multipolar competition. This paper analyses the evolution of nuclear arms control regimes from 1970 to the mid-2020s with a focus on three dimensions: the development of key multilateral and bilateral treaties, the design and practice of verification and compliance mechanisms, and the implications of these regimes for strategic stability. Using a qualitative historical-institutionalist approach and drawing on primary treaty texts, policy documents, and secondary scholarly literature, the study traces the trajectory of major agreements such as the NPT, Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties (SALT/START), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW). The analysis finds that arms control contributed significantly to reducing deployed strategic arsenals, enhancing transparency, and lowering the risk of inadvertent escalation during the late Cold War and early post-Cold War periods, but that this architecture has come under strain from recurring allegations of non-compliance, the collapse of several cornerstone agreements, and the entrance of new nuclear actors and technologies. The paper argues that future strategic stability will depend on adapting arms control to a more complex multipolar and technological environment, strengthening verification and compliance institutions, and finding inclusive frameworks that integrate both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states.
Srivastav et al. (Fri,) studied this question.