Mindfulness, Morality, and the Good Life

In this dissertation, I explore the normative dimensions of present-centered attention, with a special focus on mindfulness. In Chapter 1, I argue that dominant secular conceptions of mindfulness inappropriately conceive of mindfulness as incompatible with disapproving moral emotions and judgments, and I develop an openness-based account of mindfulness that can accommodate morally appropriate disapproval while remaining suitable for a mindful way of life. In Chapter 2, I argue that living a mindful life can help regulate “hot” moral emotions, such as anger at injustice, without undermining such emotions’ moral value, by enabling agents to affectively appreciate their emotions without being fully gripped by them. In Chapter 3, I argue that certain modes of engaged, present-centered attention (what I call presence) are non-instrumentally valuable because they are ways of attentionally engaging with life as it is, which plays a constitutive role in a good life.