The Dynamics of Revolutions

This paper answers two questions: 1) Why do revolutions sometimes start with moderate opponents of the regime, like in the Egyptian Arab Spring in 2011 and in the USSR in 1989-1991? 2) Why does the implementation of popular policies, such as Perestroika, sometimes trigger a revolution? Existing theories invariably predict that none of this should happen. We show that answers can be provided by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protests by letting dissenters choose not just whether to dissent, but also how much. In the model, regimes may differ in how they sanction small vs. large dissent; and societies may differ in how individuals perceive the cost of deviating from their own ideological convictions. Such a generalization provides a typology of revolutions with predictions about who – moderates or extremists – are more likely to start a revolution, what ideology they will express and how this will dynamically change during a revolution. The model also provides predictions about which policies may trigger a revolution and which will consolidate the regime’s strength. On question 1: Moderates are more likely to start a revolution if individuals are sensitive to even small deviations from their ideology. This sensitivity makes moderates, who slightly disagree with the regime, voice their criticism. Extremists, on the other hand, are silenced because expressing their extreme views bears heavy sanctioning. This further implies an answer to question 2: A popular policy may trigger a revolution, because, indirectly, it spurs more people to become “moderate” hence speak their minds.